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THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
AN APPLICATION IN SPANISH BANKING 
 
Ana B. Casado, Ricardo Sellers and Francisco J. Más 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on the impact of third-party complaints on firm performance. We 
propose two research hypotheses, which are developed from the literature of dissatisfaction, 
emotions, and economics. The methodology is based on an event study to estimate variation in 
firm share returns in the stock market due to the publication of the Annual Complaints Service 
Report by the Bank of Spain; as well as a regression analysis to examine the impact of the 
number of complaints per branch on the variation obtained. The empirical focus is on a sample 
of eleven banks to which complaints were made and which were quoted on the Spanish Stock 
Exchange between 1992 and 2001. The results show a negative impact of the publication of 
these annual complaint reports on the share returns of the banks concerned. Additionally, these 
returns have a negative relationship with the number of complaints per branch. 
Keywords: Third-party complaints; Firm performance; Banking industry 
 
RESUMEN 
 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el impacto de las quejas a terceras partes sobre los 
resultados empresariales. Para ello, se proponen dos hipótesis de investigación, argumentadas 
siguiendo la literatura de insatisfacción, emociones, y economía. La metodología se apoya en el 
event study para estimar la variación de la rentabilidad de las acciones de las empresas generada 
en la Bolsa por la publicación de la Memoria Anual del Servicio de Reclamaciones del Banco 
de España; así como en el análisis de regresión para examinar el impacto del número de quejas 
por oficina en dicha variación. La aplicación empírica se lleva a cabo para una muestra de once 
bancos sobre los que se efectúan las quejas y que cotizan en la Bolsa de Madrid entre 1992 y 
2001. Los resultados obtenidos ponen de manifiesto un impacto negativo de la publicación de 
dichas memorias anuales de quejas sobre la rentabilidad de las acciones de los bancos 
implicados, y que dicha rentabilidad mantiene una relación negativa con el volumen de quejas 
por oficina. 
Palabras clave: Quejas a terceras partes; Resultados empresariales; Banca 
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1. Introduction 
The study of consumer complaint behavior (CCB) has become critical in recent 
years. Research is based around the study of firstly, the particular type of consumer 
response through which complaint behavior is manifested –redress seeking, starting 
legal action, negative word-of-mouth, exit, no action- which has allowed the 
development of numerous categorisations and taxonomies (e.g., Bearden & Teel, 1983; 
Best & Andreasen, 1977; Day, 1980; Day & Landon, 1977; Hirschman, 1970; Maute & 
Forrester, 1993; Singh, 1988; Warland, Hermann, & Willits, 1975). Among them, the 
three-dimensional classification of Singh (1988) –voice, private and third-party 
responses- seems to be the most widely accepted. In particular, third-party complaints 
constitute the point of interest of our study. 
Secondly, literature has examined the determinant factors of complaint behavior, 
with various approaches. The satisfaction approach suggests that complaint behavior is 
the result of dissatisfaction with a given consumption experience (Bearden & Teel, 
1983; Prakash, 1991; Richins, 1983; Yi, 1990). Research into emotions in marketing 
(for in depth coverage, see Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer, 1999) proposes that the 
manifestation of negative emotions has a direct and positive impact on complaint 
behavior (Casado & Mas, 2002; Day, 1984; Folkes, Koletsky, & Graham, 1987; 
Westbrook, 1987; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2002). Another perspective combines the two 
streams of research - dissatisfaction and emotions-, proposing alternative 
conceptualisations of their effect on complaint behavior. Thus, some authors have found 
that dissatisfaction with service could mediate the influence of negative emotional 
response on complaint behavior, given that a negative emotional state precedes 
dissatisfaction (e.g., Mooradian & Olver, 1997; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Westbrook, 
1987; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2002); whereas recently, anger (a specific emotion) was 
found to be a full mediator between service encounter dissatisfaction and complaint 
behavior (Bougie, Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2003). Other analysed antecedents of 
complaint behavior are the perceived probability of successful compensation (e.g., 
Richins, 1983), consumer attitude towards complaining (e.g., Bearden & Mason, 1984), 
demographic characteristics (e.g., Warland et al., 1975), causal attributions (e.g., Folkes, 
1984) and the intensity of the dissatisfaction experienced (e.g., Singh & Pandya, 1991), 
among others.  
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Thirdly, research analyses the consequences of complaint behavior from various 
perspectives. Richins (1987) is based on the theory of voice/exit of Hirschman (1970) 
and proposes a negative relationship between complaint behavior and intention to 
repurchase; a link that is not proved empirically. The majority of research, however, is 
centred on the management of complaints received. Its logic is based on the idea that 
complaint handling systems are used by companies as a defensive strategy aimed at 
reducing the rate of customer defection or switching behavior, as they can turn 
dissatisfied, complaining customers into loyal ones (Fornell, 1992; Fornell & 
Wernerfelt, 1987, 1988; Fornell, Johnson, Anderson, Cha, & Bryant, 1996; Scaglione, 
1988). Underlying this proposal is the so called “service recovery paradox”, through 
which extraordinary customer recovery efforts can generate greater satisfaction than if 
there had been no problem in the first place (e.g., McCollough, Berry, & Yadav, 2000; 
Smith & Bolton, 1998; Tax, Brown, & Chandrashekaran, 1998). Furthermore, Fornell 
and Wernerfelt (1987, 1988) demonstrate mathematically, with microeconomic models, 
that a defensive marketing strategy (retaining customers through complaint handling 
systems) brings about an increase in market share and profits, as well as reducing the 
costs of offensive marketing (obtaining additional customers, encouraging brand 
switching and increasing buying frequency). However, empirical studies in this area 
only study the impact on intention to repurchase. The TARP Report (1979) presents 
data that suggests that customer loyalty could be strengthened by a company complaint 
handling system. Gilly and Gelb (1982), TARP (1981) and Andreassen (1999) find a 
positive relationship between satisfaction with complaint handling and intention to 
repurchase. Finally, Fornell (1992), although not using direct measurements of 
complaint handling efficacy, assumes that the positive/negative relationship found 
between complaints and intention to repurchase in various sectors, implies that 
complaint handling systems are successful/unsuccessful at turning complaining 
customers into loyal customers (Fornell et al., 1996). 
In any case, we have not found any studies that examine the impact of 
complaints on company performance outside the area of service recovery. In this sense, 
the major objective of the present study is to fill this gap in CCB research, proposing 
research hypotheses on the relationship between complaint behavior and company 
performance. To do this, we focus on third-party complaints, specifically from the Bank 
of Spain’s Complaints Service, which publishes an Annual Report on complaints to 
Spanish banks. The methodology applied is based on an event study to estimate the 
variation in company share returns resulting from the publication of these annual reports 
between 1992 and 2001; as well as a regression analysis to examine the impact of 
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service quality on the above relationship. The empirical application is made in Spain on 
a sample of 11 banks about which there were 4702 complaints and which were quoted 
on the Madrid stock market between 1992 and 2001. 
The paper is organised in the following way: in the second section we propose 
and argue the hypotheses; the third section covers the design of the study, specifying the 
methodology used and the data collection process; in the fourth section we present and 
discuss the results obtained and, finally, we offer the main conclusions and limitations. 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1. The third-party complaints 
The majority of academic research into complaint behavior has moved from 
purely descriptive to fundamentally theoretical analysis. However, less attention has 
been paid to third-party complaints; where the customer takes a concern to a 
government agency, consumer protection group, Better Business Bureau, or some 
formal party external to the original marketing exchange (McAlister & Erffmeyer, 
2003).  
Third-party actions are most likely to occur when consumers (Duhaime & Ash, 
1979; Singh, 1989; Tipper, 1997; Ursic, 1985): 
i) perceive that the company’s initial remedy was not adequate; 
ii) have good access to the legal system and other formal agencies; 
iii) believe that all other complaining options have been unsuccessful; 
iv) experience high anxiety levels about the complaint situation, and 
v) have generally negative attitudes toward business practices. 
Third-party complaints are especially important and troublesome to marketers 
since they represent a higher-order action than complaining to friends, family, the 
salesperson or the company (Feick, 1987). The effort and involvement associated with 
third-party complaining behavior normally indicate a degree of consumer 
dissatisfaction, company unresponsiveness or related factor, which can severely threaten 
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marketing relationships and effectiveness. In addition, third-party complaints can result 
in extensive legal costs, regulatory intervention and corporate reputation problems 
(Tipper, 1997).  
Despite the importance of third-party complaints, we have not found any studies 
that empirically analyse their impact on company performance. This study is, therefore, 
an attempt to fill this gap in marketing literature, joining the demands for greater 
attention to be given to third-party complaints made by various authors (e.g., Fisher, 
Garrett, Cannon, & Beggs, 1999; Singh, 1989). 
2.2. The relationship between third-party complaints and firm performance 
As indicated in the previous section, third-party complaints suggest, on the one 
hand, customer dissatisfaction or related factors which threaten marketing relationships, 
and, on the other hand, corporate reputation problems.  
With regard to the first aspect, the literature of dissatisfaction considers a 
complaint to be a negative response to dissatisfaction, which precedes customer 
defection (Richins, 1983; Scaglione, 1988; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996). 
Additionally, research into emotions holds that emotional negative responses (such as 
anger or disappointment) to a service failure precede complaint behavior and less 
intention to repurchase (Weiner, 2000; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der 
Pligt, 1998, 2000). Essentially, and despite their differences, both perspectives suggest 
that third-party complaints negatively affect company performance, as complaints 
precede customer defection.  
Firstly, less customer loyalty implies a lower probability of continuing to 
purchase from the same provider (Fornell, 1992), which will be reflected by lower 
company returns, as less loyalty jeopardizes a steady stream of future cash flow 
(Reichheld & Sasser, 1990; Rust & Zahorik, 1993; Rust, Zahorik, & Keiningham, 1994, 
1995). Secondly, lower customer retention should increase a company’s future 
transaction costs as it will no longer benefit from the purchase of other goods and 
services (offered by the firm) by satisfied customers, or the price premiums which 
satisfied customers are willing to pay (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990). Moreover, the 
company needs to spend heavily (advertising, promotions and sales costs) to gain new 
customers (Zeithaml et al., 1996). Additionally, dissatisfied customers are most likely to 
engage in negative word-of-mouth (Anderson, 1994; Reichheld & Sasser, 1990), which 
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could reduce the effectiveness of advertising and the attractiveness of warranties 
(Anderson, Fornell, & Lehman, 1994).  
However, apart from the effect on results from less customer retention, third-
party complaints reflect product/service failure and authors such as Crosby (1987) and 
Garvin (1988) believe that companies should allocate a high level of resources to the 
handling and management of complaints, as well as rework any defective products, 
which worsens productivity. Along this line, Anderson et al. (1994) and Anderson, 
Fornell, and Rust (1997), following an economic approach, suggest that increments in 
costs associated to product failure and productivity reduction will diminish company 
performance.  
Finally, third-party complaints negatively influence company performance as a 
result of loss of company reputation. The dissatisfaction of the complaining customer 
would indicate a worsening company reputation. Lower company reputation does not 
aid in introducing new products –given the instant awareness of the existence of 
complaints and the increase of risk of trial for the buyer (Robertson & Gatignon, 1986)-, 
it is not beneficial for maintaining and establishing relationships with suppliers, 
distributors and potential allies (Anderson & Weitz, 1989), nor does it facilitate the 
building of other company assets such as brand equity (Aaker, 1992). 
In this way, we can assume that third-party complaints have a negative impact 
on future company profits. Additionally, we can argue that the position achieved by a 
company in terms of customer complaints to an external agency is of great strategic 
importance, as it attests to its vulnerability or effectiveness in defending its current 
customers and future profits. In particular, a company’s ranking in terms of complaints 
made allows a distinction to be made, in a competitive context, between the winners and 
the losers over the temporal period analysed. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H1. The publication of the Annual Complaints Service Report by an external agency is 
associated with a reduction in the performance of the firm involved. 
H2. A greater number of complaints reported in the Annual Complaints Service Report 
is associated with a greater reduction in the performance of the firm involved.  
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3. Research design 
3.1. Methodology 
The methodology developed to reach the objectives set has two stages. The first 
estimates company return variations due to publication of annual reports on complaints 
by an external agency (Bank of Spain). For this, we apply the “event study” technique, 
which solves some operational problems derived from the way in which company 
performance is usually measured. The majority of studies use financial information 
from accounting records to measure performance, but their conclusions are largely not 
comparable due to disparities between the variables used. Furthermore, accounting data 
can be insufficient as it does not incorporate expectations on future profits and can lead 
to confusion due to the deficiencies inherent in its dependence on different conventions. 
Finally, accounting measurements are inappropriate in certain contexts, such as that of 
complaints and dissatisfaction, whose returns are manifested over long periods of time 
(Anderson et al., 1994; Lambert, 1998).  
In order to avoid these measurement problems, our study has a different 
approach; proposing the application of the technique of the event study on stock market 
share prices1. This method is based, firstly, on the portfolio theory of financial 
economics on the premise that stock markets are efficient and, secondly, on the idea that 
company share prices better reflect strategy (e.g. of customer satisfaction) than financial 
records (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In an efficient stock market, share prices reflect 
all the available information on a company; in fact, any information received by the 
market (e.g. the publication of the Annual Complaints Service Report) will be 
immediately incorporated by investors into its share price. Likewise, any change to a 
company’s share price will reflect, without bias, alterations to its future cash flows. 
Because of this and faced with the introduction of new information on customer 
complaints from the annual report of an external agency, the examination of share price 
behavior allows us to explicitly analyse underlying changes to unbiased market 
predictions on the future returns of a company due to its inclusion in the report. This 
                                                 
1 Anderson et al. (1994) and Ittner and Larcker (1998) show that stock market measurements (stock 
prices) can be of great interest as indicators of performance derived from annual indexes of expectations, 
quality and customer satisfaction (American Customer Satisfaction Index, ACSI; Swedish Customer 
Satisfaction Barometer, SCSB). 
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allows us to isolate returns derived from third-party complaints by eliminating the 
impact of other events and avoiding some of the problems of accounting data.  
In particular, an event study measures the impact of unanticipated events on 
share prices, being based on the estimation of a market model for each company event 
and on the subsequent calculation of abnormal returns. The returns on the share price of 
a company i on day t (Rit), are expressed as:   
 it i i mt itR Rα β ε= + +      (1) 
where iα  are returns on company shares which are independent of the market; Rmt is the 
rate of returns of the market portfolio; βi is the returns sensitivity of share i to variations 
to market returns; and εit is the random disturbance.  
The estimation of equation (1) allows us to calculate daily abnormal returns 
(AR) for news on company i: 
 )
ˆˆ( mtiiitit RRAR βα +−=      (2) 
where iαˆ  and iβˆ  represent the OLS parameter estimates obtained in the regressions (1) 
for the period T preceding the event. Abnormal returns are those obtained by a company 
once investors have adjusted for “normal” returns; and returns on shares are adjusted by 
subtracting expected returns from actual returns with any significant difference being 
considered abnormal.  
To analyse the effect of the publication of the Annual Complaints Service 
Reports by an external agency (Bank of Spain) on the share prices of the entities 
concerned (Hypothesis 1), we test:  
1) The significance of the average of standardized abnormal returns (SAR) for N 
news of the companies on every day of the event window:  
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residuals of the regression estimated before publication; T the period before the 
estimation plus the event window; and Rm is the mean return on the market portfolio in 
the period of estimation.  
To analyse whether these abnormal returns are significantly distinct from zero 
we use the parametric test proposed by Jaffe (1974):  
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where N is the number of news items, ARi0 are the abnormal returns on day 0 of the 
event, and  2
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σ  and 
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σ represent, respectively, the variance and covariance of shares i 
and j obtained in equation (1) in the period of estimation. The choice of this test is 
justified by the potential presence of contemporary correlation problems in the chosen 
sample, which can come from the existence of overlapping periods in any of the news 
items on different shares and from the fact that the companies analysed are from the 
same industry (Bernard, 1987; Collins and Dent, 1984). 
Additionally, to avoid possible problems derived from lack of normality in the 
returns, we also use the non-parametric test of Corrado (1989): 
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where Ki0 is the range occupied by abnormal returns ARit in the temporal series of 
abnormal returns estimated for share i and T is the total number of days analysed. This 
test uses ordinal information on returns on the event day and is not affected by variance 
in distribution. 
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2) The significance of the average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over k 
days (event window for N news items):  
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where T is the period before the estimation plus the event window, and 
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To test whether the average standardized cumulative abnormal returns is 
significantly distinct from zero we use the test Z = ACARt N½, which follows a 
standardised normal distribution for large N. 
Finally, the second section identifies the determinants of company performance 
in terms of the number of complaints received per company (hypothesis H2). To do this, 
we use a regression model that explains abnormal returns through this dimension.  
3.2. Sample 
The design of the study has been developed for the particular case of a sample 
based on the Spanish banking sector as a source of data on third-party complaints, 
which is an appropriate choice for our objectives due to the following aspects. Firstly, 
the banking sector is subject to constant supervision by financial authorities, which have 
an obligation to guarantee the honesty of banks (Canals, 1992), given the strategic value 
of the sector to a country’s economy. Essentially, the behavior of banks transcends the 
banking sector in a more significant manner than is the case in other sectors. This is 
because banking institutions live on the confidence and prudence inspired in the 
economic agents. Untrustworthiness brought about by a bank could spread to the 
banking system as a whole and result in a massive withdrawal of funds which banks 
would not be able to handle and the consequent paralysis of the economy. On the other 
hand, the actions of both public and private consumer organisations constitute an 
element that has strengthened control over banking practices in Spain in recent years. 
Consequently, public organisations have been developing a system of supervision for 
the banking sector, which includes the Complaints Service created by the Bank of Spain 
(see section 3.4). 
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Secondly, banking products are highly diffused in the consumer market (almost 
all households have some type of banking product), which means that the probability of 
unsatisfactory experiences resulting in complaints is quite high. In fact, the banking 
sector is one of those that receive the greatest number of complaints to Spanish 
consumer organisations. 
Finally, there is the availability of data on complaints from the Annual 
Complaints Service Report of the Bank of Spain, which can be consulted by any 
economic agent (consumers, companies and government organisations). Electronic 
versions of the most recent reports can be found on the Bank of Spain web site 
(www.bce.es).  
In the sample of banks selected, we include all the banks quoted on the Madrid 
stock market that have received complaints through the Complaints Service of the Bank 
of Spain. These eleven banks constitute a numerically small sample, but they represent 
the 75.3% of the sector's total assets in 2001, according to information from the 
Banking Control Council. In any case, the study may have limited generalisation onto 
the whole sector due to the limited sample, so we will make our conclusions only in 
terms of the banks analysed.  
3.3. Data collection 
The application of the proposed methodology is based on the following data 
collection process (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In the first stage we consider all banks 
quoted on the Madrid stock market that have complaints registered in the Complaints 
Service of the Bank of Spain between 1992 and 2001. These are: the Banco Bilbao-
Vizcaya, Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya-Argentaria (a result of a merger in 2000 of the banks of 
Bilbao-Vizcaya and Argentaria), Banco de Santander, Banco Central Hispano, Banco 
Santander-Central-Hispano (formed in 1999 from the merger of the Banco de Santander 
and the Banco Central Hispano), Banco Popular, Bankinter, Banco Español de Crédito 
(Banesto), Banco Zaragozano, Banco Atlántico and Banco Pastor.  
In the second stage, the first news items about the 10 Annual Reports of the 
Complaints Service of the Bank of Spain between 1992 and 2001 are identified. To this 
end, the necessary search was made in the BARATZ database, which provides 
information published in 28 different newspapers of national or regional coverage. The 
event date is defined as the first day on which the news is disclosed in any of the 
publications included in the database.  
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In the third stage, in order to identify any abnormal behavior in the returns on 
these companies’ shares, we select the k length of the “event window”. In other words, 
we consider the five days before and after the publication date (-5, +5) due to the fact 
that, although the majority of information on complaints is usually quickly incorporated 
into share prices, it can occasionally be leaked out before its formal publication or its 
effect on the share price can be delayed.  
In the fourth stage, we reject the impact of publication of annual reports on 
complaints on banks whose “event window” coincides with the publication of certain 
announcements by the bank itself, such as public share offers, dividend declarations and 
large-scale share acquisitions. This allows for the exclusive measurement of the effect 
of third-party complaints and eliminates the possibility of including confusing effects. 
This reduces the sample to 47 news releases about annual reports on complaints relating 
to the 11 banks. 
In the fifth stage, we collect data on the daily share returns (Rit) of the eleven 
banks. We, therefore, use stock market data, as opposed to accounting data, to measure 
company performance. The historical data sample selected is of the daily returns of the 
11 banks quoted on the Madrid stock exchange in the period from the 2nd of January 
1992 to the 31st of December 2001. This temporal period is defined by the availability 
of daily market information. As a subrogate variable of the true return on the market 
portfolio (Rmt), we use the IBEX-35 index, which is representative of the Spanish stock 
market. The information is obtained from the Stock Exchange Information System. 
Finally, in order to analyse the determinants of excess returns, we collect 
information on the number of complaints/branches, that is, the volume of complaints 
about each entity, corrected by their size. This ratio denotes the position reached by a 
bank as regards customer complaints to an external agency. Information relative to the 
volume of complaints received by each entity is found in the Annual Complaints 
Service Reports of the Bank of Spain, while the number of branches per bank comes 
from the Commercial Performance Information Bureau of the Bank of Spain.  
As a control variable, we use company size. This variable is used to control 
economies and diseconomies of scale at a corporate level. It is measured by assets in the 
event year, information that is found in the Commercial Performance Information 
Bureau of the Bank of Spain. 
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3.4. Consumer complaint procedure 
The Complaints Service of the Bank of Spain was created in 1987 in order to 
receive and process complaints by banking customers about acts that possibly break 
rules of discipline or good practice. For a complaint to be accepted by the Service, it is 
essential to show that a written complaint was first made to the Customer Complaints 
Manager (or equivalent) of the bank, when available (75% of Spanish banks have a 
person or department to handle complaints). In the period from 1992-2001 the 
Complaints Service received an annual average of 20 complaints per bank (of the 300 
financial entities operating in Spain in that period, half are banks).  
Once a complaint is accepted, the entity concerned has the opportunity to put its 
case forward. As a rule, the process concludes with a report which states whether the 
entity has complied, or not, with good banking practices. This report is sent to the 
customer and the bank concerned. Although the reports made by the Service have no 
official power, banks largely comply with them. 
The Complaints Service publishes an annual report which includes a statistical 
summary of proceedings taken in the previous year: a summary of complaints 
(presented, accumulated and in process), the location of the presentation of the 
complaint, the nature of the entity complained about (banks, savings banks, credit 
cooperatives, other financial credit establishments), the entities receiving most 
complaints and the type of complaint, or the material object of complaint (active 
operations, passive operations, credit cards etc.). These reports are also available on the 
Internet (www.bce.es).   
In summary, the essential nature of this external agency coincides with the 
following dimensions, which Singh (1988) uses to describe customer complaint 
behavior to external agencies: (a) it contacts companies (objects of complaints) so that 
they are aware of the customer’s problem and (b) advises other consumers of problems 
found in companies’ services.  
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4. Results  
4.1. Estimation of return variation resulting from the publication of the 
Annual Complaints Service Report 
Taking the event study as a starting point, this section estimates the parameters 
of the market model (1) for a period T of 145 days (from t-150 to t-5 days relative to the 
event date t=0), which is a temporal period often used in this type of study. The 
parameters estimated allow us to calculate abnormal returns for the event date (2) 
derived from the publication of the Complaints Service Report by the Bank of Spain.  
Table 1 presents the estimations of the average abnormal returns (AR average) and 
the average standardised abnormal returns (SAR average) on each of the days comprising 
the event windows for the 47 event impacts on the banks. The results obtained show that, 
on average, the publication of annual reports on complaints is associated with negative 
abnormal returns: average abnormal returns are of –0.40% on the event date, –0.35% on 
the day after the event and –0.46% on t=3. They are all significant using the parametric test 
of Jaffe and the non parametric test of Corrado. On day t=3 we find the greatest abnormal 
losses or negative excess returns for the period ±5 days around the event. This indicates 
that, on average, entities mentioned in the annual reports of the Complaints Service of the 
Bank of Spain, suffer a loss of –0.46% of abnormal returns on day t=3.  
Alternatively, a standard event study practice is to examine cumulative abnormal 
returns for various windows around the event date. The analysis of the abnormal returns, 
which surround the day of publication, allows us to take account for any uncertainty 
around the real event date and find the accumulative effect of an event. Also, the effect can 
be felt over various days around the event, given the gradual availability of information 
and, therefore, of interpretation of the impact of the event on future company profits. 
Along this line, we show (see Table 1) that the average standardised cumulative abnormal 
returns (ACAR) in the pre-event windows {(-5, -1), (-4, -3), (-4, -2), (-3, -1), (-2, 0) and (-
1, 0)} are not significant, which seems to show that information is not divulged before 
publication (e.g. press conferences). 
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Table 1. Variation of returns due to publication of Annual Complaints Service Reports 
Event 
day 
Average 
AR (%) 
Average 
SAR (%) t
a tb Event window 
Cumulative 
Average AR 
(%) 
Zc 
-5 -0.3466 -0.5947 -1.1737 -1.5691 (-5,-1) -0.3716 -0.9463 
-4 -0.0799 -0.2022 -0.4552 -0.9656 (-4,-3) -0.1605 -0.6465 
-3 -0.0806 -0.2509 -0.4590 -0.5076 (-4,-2) -0.0554 -0.1823 
-2 0.1051 0.0961 0.5984 0.5271 (-3,-1) 0.0549 0.1807 
-1 0.0304 0.1035 0.1735 1.2136 (-2,0) -0.2665 -0.8762 
0 -0.4020 -0.7169 -2.2895*** -2.3970*** (-1,0) -0.3716 -1.4963 
1 -0.3564 -0.699 -2.0297*** -2.6158*** (0,+2) -0.9835 -3.2336*** 
2 -0.2250 -0.3648 -1.2813 -1.2978 (+1,+2) -0.5814 -2.3413*** 
3 -0.4662 -0.7709 -2.6549*** -3.9127*** (+1,+3) -1.0477 -3.4445*** 
4 -0.0559 -0.0868 -0.3184 -0.9726 (+2,+4) -0.7472 -4.8396*** 
5 -0.317 0.0827 -0.1807 -0.9687 (+3,+5) -0.5539 -1.8211 
NOTE: AR = Abnormal Return; SAR = Standardized Abnormal Returns 
a
 Statistic t based on the parametric contrast of Jaffe (1974) 
b Statistic t based on the nonparametric contrast of Corrado (1989) 
c
 Z=ACARtN1/2. statistical test that follows a standardized normal distribution for large N 
 *** Prob.<0.01; ** Prob.<0.05; * Prob.<0.10. 
 
However, the panorama changes when we look at the post-event windows. Four 
temporal periods: {(0, +2), (+1, +2), (+1, +3), and (+2, +4)} show significant ACAR, 
which indicates that some investors react on the same day and others later. To be precise, 
the global 3-day window (+1,+3) shows the greatest loss of ACAR with a value of -1.04%. 
This reaction delay seems plausible as news of the publication of the annual reports on 
complaints could motivate investors to re-examine company product positioning and 
marketing strategies. It seems, therefore, that they make a negative valuation of strategies 
and react accordingly (Mathur & Mathur, 1995). Apart from the statistical significance of 
the results, their economic importance is illustrated as follows (Nayyar, 1995): i) an ACAR 
of –1.04% over three days is the equivalent of annual returns of -239.01 %; and, ii) an 
ACAR of –1.04% for an average sample market value (product of the number of shares by 
the share price) of Euro 89,892.83 million on t=1, implies a loss in value of Euro 934.88 
million in three days.  
In summary, the evidence of significant negative ARs on the event date (t=0), on 
t=1 and on t=3, along with the negative ACARs for windows (0, +2), (+1, +2), (+1, +3), 
and (+2, +4), allow us to accept hypothesis H1 that the publication of the annual reports of 
the Complaints Service of the Bank of Spain has a negative effect on the performance of 
the banks involved. This conclusion has the implication that the publication of the annual 
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report is an index which provides share holders and investors with useful information (in 
line with Fornell, 1992), who give lower potential value to entities which appear in the 
report, as they assume that customer complaints have a negative impact on future profits 
due to expectations of lower customer loyalty, increased service failure costs and lower 
reputation (Anderson et al., 1994). 
4.2. Determinants of return variation derived from complaints  
Once we have proved that the publication of the annual reports of the Complaints 
Service of the Bank of Spain is associated with negative changes to the returns on the 
shares of the banks implicated, we examine the possible influence of the number of 
complaints per branch. To do this, we regress the average cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR) for the three days of (+1,+3) with the variables shown in the data collection 
section. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables for the sample of 47 
impacts of the publication of the annual reports. By using normality tests, such as that of 
Jarque-Bera, the assumption that residuals are normally distributed cannot be rejected. The 
test of Durbin-Watson rejects the existence of autocorrelation of order 1 residuals and the 
test of Breusch-Godfrey rejects order 2 autocorrelation. With respect to homoscedasticity, 
White and Breusch-Pagan tests accept the null hypothesis of equality of residual variance. 
Consequently, the estimation is made for OLS. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation Max. Min. 
Asset (mill. €) 42610 52523 193570 2134 
Number of complaints / branches 0.0763 0.321 0.1703 0.0215 
Complaints 99 104 440 15 
Branches 1362 1113 3830 245 
Correlation between asset and number of complaints/branches                           0.1441 
 
The joint significance tests of the independent variables allow us to conclude that 
significant information is obtained at a level below 1% by introducing the variables of 
complaints per branch and size (see Table 3). Likewise, the coefficients of determination 
and adjusted R2 are situated around 14.65 % and 10.23 % respectively.  
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Table 3. Explicative factors of the excess in returns (standard errors in brackets) 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept 
Number of 
complaints / 
branches 
Size R2 Adjusted R2 F 
Average 
ACAR 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
-0.162** 
(0.071) 
-1.13 E-11 
(4.39 E-11) 
0.146 0.102 3.183** 
*** Prob.<0.01; ** Prob.<0.05; * Prob.<0.10. 
 
The significance tests of the individual parameters show that the number of 
complaints per branch has an influence on the banks’ abnormal returns, as its coefficient is 
significant at a level below 5%. The negative sign of the variable of number of complaints 
per branch shows that a greater value for this ratio is associated with higher negative 
abnormal returns, which leads us to accept hypothesis H2. In other words, a higher number 
of complaints per branch received by a bank in the annual report of an external agency 
reflects its vulnerability as regards customer retention and future profit protection and 
would result in it being a “loser” in the period analysed. This represents a lower value 
provided to customers and lower potential value for a shareholder, who would be less 
motivated to get involved in an investment relationship with the bank (Ngobo, 1999). An 
alternative explanation, in the field of banks with complaint handling systems, would be 
the so called “vicious circle of complaints” (Fornell & Westbrook, 1984) according to 
which, as a bank receives more complaints it becomes less responsive so that, instead of 
making good use of its complaints procedure system, the company behaves 
dysfunctionally (Fornell, 1992).  
Finally, we find no significant influence of size as a control variable on excess 
returns. 
5. Discussion 
The implication that company performance can be explained through third-party 
complaints has led us to analyse these phenomena in the Spanish context of the publication 
of annual reports by the Complaints Service of the Bank of Spain between 1992 and 2001. 
The methodology of analysis is based on an event study, starting with the theory of 
portfolio of financial economics with the premise that stock markets are efficient and that 
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company share prices better reflect their service quality strategy and their customers’ 
satisfaction than their accounting structure. To be precise, this method measures the impact 
of a sample of events (publication of Annual Complaints Service Reports by the Bank of 
Spain) on share prices, estimating a market model for each news item referring to a 
company and calculating the abnormal returns deriving from each event. Later, a 
regression analysis examines the impact of the number of complaints per branch on excess 
returns. The methodology is shown to be particularly useful for analysing the impact of 
complaints on performance, avoiding some inherent problems of using accounting data.  
The empirical application carried out on the sample finds significant negative 
returns on the event date (t=0), on the day after the event (t=1) and on t=3, as well as 
negative accumulated returns in different post-event windows, which suggests that, on 
average, the stock market reacts negatively to the publication of the annual reports of the 
Complaints Service of an external agency. Likewise, the model of behavior proposed 
shows that abnormal returns depend on the number of complaints per branch, suggesting a 
negative relationship between complaints per branch and performance.  
5.1. Managerial implications 
The implications of these results to business management are as follows: firstly, the 
fact that third-party complaints negatively affect expectations of future profits has the 
important strategic implication that resources allocated to improving customer satisfaction 
(reducing complaints or applying adequate complaint handling programmes (Fornell & 
Wernerfelt, 1987)) should be treated as an investment rather than an expense. Additionally, 
customer satisfaction is a market based asset (Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998), 
meaning that the implantation of an orientation towards customers as assets implies 
aligning company processes, resources, result measurement and organisational structure 
towards dealing with customers as assets (Anderson et al., 1994). 
Secondly, third-party complaints are an especially important dimension insofar as 
complaints which go this far are usually evidence of an breakdown in the marketing 
process of building relationships and exchange, as well as of loss of reputation (McAlister 
& Erffmeyer, 2003). This implies the need to implement effective complaint management 
systems that include the monitoring of complaints to external agencies.  
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5.2. Limitations 
As limitations of the study we would like to point out the possible existence of bias 
in the results due to the selection of Madrid stock market quoted banks. In this way, we do 
not consider certain other financial entities (savings banks and banks) which are not quoted 
on the stock market but which receive complaints. Moreover, the entities selected are of a 
large size, which restricts generalisation of the conclusions. 
However, we consider this research to be a new contribution to the study of the 
relationship between third-party complaints and company performance.  
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